



DENVER
OFFICE OF THE
INDEPENDENT MONITOR

2025 Semiannual Report

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Independent Monitor

The Office of the Independent Monitor

The Office of the Independent Monitor (“OIM”) is charged with working to ensure accountability, effectiveness, and transparency in the Denver Police and Sheriff disciplinary processes. The OIM is responsible for:

- ◆ Ensuring that the complaint and commendation processes are accessible to all community members;
- ◆ Monitoring investigations into community complaints, internal complaints, and critical incidents involving sworn personnel;
- ◆ Making recommendations on findings and discipline;
- ◆ Publicly reporting information regarding patterns of complaints, findings, and discipline;
- ◆ Making recommendations for improving Police and Sheriff policy, practices, and training;
- ◆ Conducting outreach to the Denver community and stakeholders in the disciplinary process; and
- ◆ Promoting alternative and innovative means for resolving complaints, such as mediation.

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Contents

1	<i>Overview</i>	1
	Suspected Overdoses in DSD Jails	2
	Investigations into Nonfatal Suspected Overdoses in DSD Jails	2
	DPD Education-Based Development Program (EBD)	3
	Audit of the OIM by the Denver Auditor's Office	6
	Aggregate Information about Investigation and Discipline Reviews	6
2	<i>Denver Police Department Monitoring</i>	8
	Complaints Recorded	9
	Most Common Complaint Specifications	9
	Intake Investigations, Screening Decisions, and Outcomes . .	11
	Significant Disciplinary Cases Closed	12
	Commendations and Awards	18
3	<i>Denver Sheriff Department Monitoring</i>	22
	Complaints Recorded	22
	Most Common Complaint Specifications	23
	Intake Investigations, Screening Decisions, and Outcomes . .	25
	Significant Disciplinary Cases Closed	26
	Appeals of Significant Discipline	28
	Commendations and Awards	29
4	<i>Critical Incidents</i>	32
	Critical Incidents: Denver Police Department	32
	DPD Officer-Involved Shootings	33

DPD Accidental Discharges34
Deaths During DPD Contact34
DPD Critical Incidents Closed34
DPD Accidental Discharges Closed38
Critical Incidents: Denver Sheriff Department40
DSD Critical Incidents41
DSD Critical Incidents Closed41

1 Overview

The Office of the Independent Monitor (“OIM”) is charged with monitoring the disciplinary systems in the Denver Police and Denver Sheriff Departments (“DPD” and “DSD,” respectively), making policy recommendations to those departments, and conducting outreach to communities throughout Denver. The OIM publishes a Semiannual Report providing information about the work of the OIM and about complaints, investigations, and discipline of sworn police and sheriff personnel during the first half of the year.

The OIM’s 2025 Semiannual Report is presented in four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of several key issues that the OIM worked on in the first half of 2025. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss OIM monitoring of the DPD and the DSD, respectively, and summarize patterns in complaint and disciplinary trends in each department. Finally, Chapter 4 contains information about critical incidents, including officer-involved shootings and deaths during contact with DPD officers and DSD deputies that occurred in the first half of 2025.¹

Suspected Overdoses in DSD Jails

In recent years, the DSD, much like other jail systems across the nation,² has observed a surge in overdose-related incidents among its jail population.³ According to data published by the DSD, the number of overdose-related incidents within the jails has increased in recent years, as evidenced by the rising instances of naloxone⁴ administration by DSD staff.⁵ Specifically, there were more than 55 incidents during which naloxone was used in 2024. In the first half of 2025, there have been more than 25 incidents during which naloxone was used.⁶

To respond to the increased introduction of contraband and overdose-related incidents in jails, the DSD has established the “Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution Task Force”, consisting of DSD personnel and representatives from the DPD, the District Attorney’s Office, the Denver Crime Lab, the OIM, and Federal agencies. The Task Force has pursued a three-pronged mitigation strategy focusing on: 1) reducing the introduction of contraband while supporting individuals suffering from substance misuse disorders, 2) enhancing the capability of detecting drugs inside the jails, and 3) taking legal action against those who successfully introduce contraband inside jail facilities.⁷

The OIM commends the DSD for establishing a task force and for taking measures towards tackling the pressing issue of contraband and overdose-related incidents inside jails. The OIM will review the status of current efforts to determine whether more steps are needed to be taken to interdict controlled substances contraband in jail facilities.

Investigations into Nonfatal Suspected Overdoses in DSD Jails

The OIM was concerned about the lack of administrative investigations related to suspected overdose incidents inside the DSD jails and made direct recommendations to the Department of Safety.

On July 25, 2025, the previous Executive Director of Public Safety (“EDOS”), Armando Saldate, issued a directive regarding the handling of suspected drug overdose incidents in DSD jail facilities.⁸ According to the directive, the DSD will secure the scene during incidents where naloxone is administered to a person and the condition of the person is stable with no serious bodily injuries or risk of death from the suspected overdose.⁹ The DSD will also be responsible for processing the scene, including reviewing all the relevant facility video and BWC; conducting a thorough search of the victim’s cell utilizing a physical search, a DSD drug

detection K9, and/or drug detection technology; and providing all relevant reports, rounds trackers, and video of the incident to the Administrative Investigations Unit (“AIU”) of the Public Integrity Division (“PID”). The AIU is then required to conduct an administrative investigation of the circumstances surrounding the suspected overdose incident. The investigation will include review of facility video, BWC review, rounds tracker reviews, the DSD medical response review, and if necessary, staff and inmate interviews. Like with all administrative investigations, the OIM will review each investigation and, if necessary, make recommendations.

The OIM commends the Department of Public Safety (“DOS”) for directing the opening of administrative investigations into suspected overdose incidents in DSD jail facilities.

DPD Education-Based Development Program (EBD)

Since 2008, the DPD has maintained a Discipline Handbook that outlines its discipline system and links specific forms of misconduct to appropriate penalties.¹⁰ The Discipline Handbook, and the associated Discipline Matrix,¹¹ was developed through extensive input from representatives of the DPD, City Management, appointed officials, legal advisors, policing experts, the OIM, and concerned members of the public to create a discipline system that ensures a fair process of reviewing cases consistently, making disciplinary penalties reasonably consistent, eliminating any unjustifiable disparities between discipline findings while still, holding officers accountable and providing transparency of the process. The Discipline Handbook serves the community, the officers, and the administration by uniformly reinforcing the acceptable standards of conduct and presenting a clear methodology for consequences related to a failure to abide by such standards. While the Discipline Handbook has been edited over the years, the general structure of the discipline system has remained relatively unchanged since its development.

In December 2024, the DPD proposed updating its Operations Manual to revise the discipline system described in the Discipline Handbook by introducing an Education-Based Development (“EBD”) program that would eliminate the discipline imposed for up to 85% of misconduct¹² and impose training instead. If enacted, EBD will upend the current DPD discipline system by eliminating the possible imposition of discipline for certain misconduct violations. By removing

Chapter 1 :: Overview

accountability and transparency from discipline, EBD will substantially undermine community trust in policing.

EBD has not been recognized as a best practice by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”), the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”), or the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Further, the OIM is aware of no research suggesting that the introduction of an EBD program improves officer accountability or outcomes for community members. There is no evidence that EBD impacts recidivism either. More importantly, in jurisdictions where EBD programs have been implemented, oversight agencies have released reports that document significant issues with the approach.¹³ As a result, the OIM does not agree with EBD or believe it is necessary. While additional training that targets demonstrated deficiencies is welcome, such training is currently provided for under the current discipline system in addition to the discipline penalties required by the Discipline Handbook.¹⁴ That is why we have publicly noted our opposition to this proposed policy.

To inform the community about this possible fundamental change to police accountability, the OIM has given presentations to stakeholder groups, including, but not limited to, the Denver Task Force to Reimagine Policing and Public Safety, Together Colorado, Greater Metro Denver Ministerial Alliance, Latino Community Forum, and brother jeff’s Cultural Center. In July, the OIM also presented information about the EBD program to the Health and Safety committee of the Denver City Council.¹⁵ Despite noting our strong opposition to the proposed EBD program, we outlined the minimum requirements that the community should ensure are included in the EBD program if the DPD and the DOS decide to move forward, including:

- Prohibit the use of EBD for all cases that could be categorized with a Conduct Category D specification and higher, including allegations of inappropriate force;
- Require the establishment and documentation of criteria for determining if a case qualifies for EBD;
- Require consensus between the DPD and the OIM when determining what discipline review a case takes;
- Ensure all EBD cases receive thorough and complete investigations certified by the OIM;

- Require that the DOS/DPD share draft EBD Agreements with the OIM for review before finalizing, as required by Denver Revised Municipal Code (“DRMC”) § 2-389;
- Require that EBD cases have sustained findings and are used to escalate penalties in future cases;
- Prohibit EBD Agreements from requiring training that an officer has already completed and ensure EBD training is not substituted for in-service training;
- Require that complainants be provided with information that the officer completed EBD training in lieu of discipline in closure letters; and,
- Require that EBD is scientifically evaluated and shown to produce positive outcomes for the Denver community.¹⁶

Despite our strong opposition to EBD, the OIM has worked diligently to provide recommendations through its review process. After being approached by the DPD with the concept of EBD in December 2024, the OIM has sent questions to the DPD to clarify their proposal. The EBD draft policy was provided to the OIM in January 2025. The OIM reviewed and provided recommendations and additional questions on draft EBD policies in March, July, and August of 2025. The DPD was responsive to each of those requests, providing us a revised draft and written responses to our recommendations. In July 2025, the DPD created a public comment portal that published a draft of the EBD policy and offered the opportunity for community members to submit feedback.¹⁷ We commend the DPD for giving the community an opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed policy.

The OIM recommends that the DPD immediately suspend the development of the proposed EBD program. The City and County of Denver should not expose itself to risk based upon an experimental system of discipline. If the DPD desires to pursue an EBD program in the future, we recommend that it convene a task force of representatives from City and County of Denver agencies, the Denver City Council, the Citizen Oversight Board, the OIM, and a variety of community groups focused on criminal justice to determine whether an EBD program is consistent with community goals and expectations for officer accountability. This is how the original discipline matrix was developed, and we believe any major change to the discipline process should be pursued in the same manner.¹⁸

Audit of the OIM by the Denver Auditor's Office

In 2024, the Denver Auditor's Office began an audit of the OIM. The audit concluded on September 18, 2025, and the Auditor's Office published the results in a report titled, "Office of the Independent Monitor: Police and Sheriff Civilian Oversight".¹⁹ In the report, the auditor presents four findings and six recommendations. Although the OIM does not agree with all the findings and rationale behind the six recommendations, our office did agree to implement the recommendations some of which include conducting a further review and an evaluation of the OIM ordinance (DRMC § 2-371, *et seq.*) and internal policies.

Specifically, the OIM agreed to reevaluate the city charter and city ordinance requirements to publicly share recommendations for investigations, discipline, and policy reviews and document its considerations, conclusions, and any limits related to the deliberative process privilege.²⁰ The OIM also agreed to reevaluate whether its policy of submitting its public reports to the City Attorney's Office for review is required and document its considerations and conclusions.²¹ Further, the OIM agreed to expand the section of its annual report that summarizes the timeliness with which misconduct cases are handled. Particularly, the OIM agreed to publish the timeliness of its investigation and discipline reviews and to find ways to report the timeliness of all parties involved in the investigation and review processes, per phase, without adding too much confusion to the average reader.²² In addition, the OIM agreed to update its database to include a data field that distinguishes between mandatory and discretionary case reviews²³ and track those results in its regular internal reporting.²⁴ Finally, the OIM agreed to develop and publish a strategic plan²⁵ and implement it.²⁶

Aggregate Information about Investigation and Discipline Reviews

The OIM has been working for years to build or acquire a database to systematically store detailed information about its DPD and DSD investigation and discipline reviews. The purchase of a commercially available database was deemed too expensive, and early attempts by OIM employees to build a database from the ground up were unsuccessful. In 2022, the OIM came to an agreement with the city's Technology Services ("TS") department to develop a database on the Salesforce platform. The design and development of the database lasted more than

a year, and the database was first launched in June 2023. Revisions and refinements were needed before the OIM was able to reliably store information in the database.

The OIM started adding information in the database systematically in the early months of 2024. Since then, the OIM has created internal policies and procedures for the use of the database and has developed internal reports that systematically check the reliability and consistency of the information entered into the database on a routine basis.

The development of this database was crucial for the OIM's ability to present information, in statistical and summary form, about the OIM's assessment of the sufficiency of investigations and the appropriateness of disciplinary actions, as required by ordinance.²⁷ Starting with its 2025 Annual Report, the OIM will be able to present to the community information such as the percentage of investigations that were returned to the departments for additional work, the category of recommendations the OIM made during the investigation review process, the percentage of those recommendations that were implemented by the departments, and the percentage of instances where the OIM discipline recommendation was different from the final discipline imposed by the Department of Safety.

In this semiannual report, we will present the percentage of investigations that were returned for additional work in the first half of 2025. A core OIM function is reviewing administrative investigations of misconduct complaints to ensure that they are thorough, complete, and fair to community members, officers, and deputies.²⁸ Of the 216 cases closed by the DPD in the first half of 2025, the OIM returned 34.7% for additional work. Of the 178 cases closed by the DSD in the first half of 2025, the OIM returned 56.2% for additional work.

2 Denver Police Department Monitoring

Introduction


The OIM is responsible for monitoring DPD investigations into complaints involving sworn personnel and for ensuring that the complaint process is accessible to all community members.²⁹ Having an accessible complaint process is critical for several reasons. First, complaints provide the DPD with information it may use to hold officers accountable when they do not live up to DPD and community standards of conduct. Second, complaints may provide information that can be used to improve police services through the refinement of policies, procedures, and training. Third, complaints can identify points of friction between officers and the community, which can support the development of outreach and education initiatives. Finally, an open complaint process tends to foster community confidence in the police, which enables officers to effectively perform their important public safety function.

In this chapter, we review information about the DPD's complaints, investigations, findings, discipline, and commendations.

Complaints Recorded in the First Half of 2025

Figure 2.1 presents the number of complaints recorded by the DPD during the first half of 2025 and the first halves of the previous three years.³⁰ These numbers do not include most scheduled discipline cases, such as when a DPD officer violates a traffic law or misses a court date, but they do include complaints involving violations of the DPD’s Body Worn Camera (“BWC”) Policy.³¹ The DPD recorded 190 community complaints in the first half of 2025, a 28% increase from the total the DPD recorded in the first half of 2024. Internal complaints recorded by the DPD decreased by 6%, from 50 in the first half of 2024 to 47 in the first half of 2025.

Figure 2.1: Complaints Recorded, First Halves of 2022–2025



As we have noted in previous reports, it is very difficult to explain fluctuations in the number of complaints filed over time. Patterns in complaints can change as the result of developments in organizational policy, practice, or training. Complaint numbers can also increase or decrease in response to a range of other factors, including, but not limited to, media coverage, changes in complaint-triage practices, and changes in the types of complaints that are recorded or not recorded.

Most Common Complaint Specifications

Individual complaints can include one or more misconduct specifications, which reflect the rules that a DPD officer might be disciplined for violating. Table 2.1

Chapter 2 :: DPD Monitoring

presents some of the most common complaint specifications from the first half of 2025 and the first halves of the previous three years.³² The most common specifications recorded by the DPD in the first half of 2025 were Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders and Discourtesy. Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders is a specification that covers a wide range of possible violations, including, but not limited to, unconstitutional search and seizure, improper handling of evidence and personal property, and violations of the DPD's BWC Policy.³³ Discourtesy is a specification used when officers are alleged to have violated a rule requiring them to be "orderly, attentive, respectful, and exercise patience and discretion in the performance of their duties."³⁴

Table 2.1: Most Common Specifications, First Halves of 2022–2025³⁵

Specification	2022	2023	2024	2025
Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders	33%	48%	55%	68%
Discourtesy	12%	14%	15%	10%
Failure to Make, File, or Complete Official Required Reports	7%	6%	5%	5%
Conduct Prohibited by Law	2%	2%	4%	3%
Service Complaint	5%	5%	6%	3%
Unassigned	0%	0%	0%	2%
Aggravated Conduct Prohibited by Law	1%	1%	0%	1%
Careless Handling of Firearms or Less Lethal Weapons	1%	1%	1%	1%
Disobedience of an Order	1%	0%	1%	1%
Failure to Give Name and Badge Number	1%	1%	1%	1%
Rough or Careless Handling of City and Department Property	3%	3%	3%	1%
All Other Specifications	35%	20%	9%	4%
Total Number of Specifications	356	381	327	407

Table 2.2 provides more details by reporting the most common rules, policies, and orders ("Directives") associated with Duty to Obey Department Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specifications recorded in the first half of 2025 and the previous three years.

Table 2.2: Most Common Directives, First Halves of 2022–2025

Directive	2022	2023	2024	2025
105.00 Use of Force Policy	4%	16%	16%	17%
104.01 General Arrest Procedures	11%	10%	7%	13%
119.04 BWC Policy	26%	23%	16%	7%
106.02(2) Prisoner Property	7%	4%	2%	5%
107.02 Warrantless Searches of Motor Vehicles	1%	1%	0%	4%
117.05 Department of Safety EEO Policy	4%	3%	2%	4%
All Other Directives	47%	44%	57%	50%
Total Number of Directives	117	184	179	276

The most common Directive recorded in 2025 was the DPD Use of Force Policy, which is the section of DPD’s Operations Manual that addresses the force authorized and prohibited by the DPD and procedures for reporting, investigating, and reviewing use of force incidents.³⁶ In 2023, the DPD began addressing allegations of inappropriate or excessive force using the Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specification rather than the Inappropriate Force specification defined in the DPD Discipline Handbook.³⁷ The most significant consequence of this procedural change is the discipline ranges associated with the two specifications. The presumptive penalty associated with the previously used Inappropriate Force specification ranged from a minimum 10-day suspension to termination. The presumptive penalty associated with the Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specification ranges from an oral reprimand to termination.

Intake Investigations, Screening Decisions, and Outcomes

In the first half of 2025, the DPD closed a total of 168 community complaints and 48 internal complaints. Table 2.3 shows the outcomes of these complaints. There were clear differences in outcomes between complaints filed by community members and internal complaints filed by DPD personnel. Among community complaints closed in the first half of 2025, 60% were declined after an initial intake investigation, while 21% of internal complaints were closed as declines. Internal complaints were much more likely to result in a sustained finding than community complaints. Specifically, 71% of internal complaints closed in the first half of 2025 resulted in at least 1 sustained finding, while 13% of community complaints resulted in a sustained finding.

Chapter 2 :: DPD Monitoring

Table 2.3: Outcomes of Closed Complaints, First Half of 2025

Outcome	Community Complaints	Internal Complaints
Declined	60%	21%
Administrative Review/Not Reviewed	0%	2%
Service Complaint	8%	0%
Mediation	5%	0%
Informal	14%	4%
Not Sustained/Exonerated/Unfounded	1%	2%
Sustained	13%	71%

Significant Disciplinary Cases Closed in the First Half of 2025³⁸

Terminations

■ On September 2, 2023, an officer driving his personal vehicle struck a stop sign, struck a car, drove on to the front yard of a residence, and then left the scene without stopping and locating the owner of the vehicle. The officer was terminated from probationary status prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ An officer had two cases alleging misconduct. In the first case, on October 14, 2023, an off-duty officer (“Officer A”) pulled over a person for speeding and careless driving and did not activate his BWC. During the traffic stop, the officer made inappropriate comments and threatened to put a note in her record so that in the future she would be assessed the hardest possible fine and her vehicle would be impounded for a year. The complainant agreed to mediation, but the officer failed to cooperate in a professional manner. During the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) investigation, the officer lied about having operational issues with his BWC, claiming that it malfunctioned during the traffic stop. Officer A was suspended for ten days for conduct prejudicial and terminated for commission of a deceptive act. He appealed his termination.

In the second case, on March 4, 2024, Officer A and four other officers (“Officer B,” “Officer C,” “Officer D,” and “Officer E”) responded to a home and took a man into custody for breaking into the home. The man continued to yell but did not attempt or threaten the officers. Officers B, C, and E controlled the man on the

ground, and Officer D used his hand to control the man's head against the floor. Officer A then entered and used his foot to pin the man's head against the ground when the other officers already had control of the man's arms and his head was controlled against the ground. Officer A was suspended for ten days for violating the DPD's Use of Force Policy for pinning a man's head when it was not reasonable or necessary to do so. He appealed the suspension.

■ An officer had four cases alleging misconduct. In the first case, on December 17, 2023, the officer was working as a clerk at the District 6 station when a man came into the station to report a hit and run traffic accident. The officer gave him a form to fill out and told him afterwards he would enter the filled-out form into the system. After calling the station to get the accident report number and then checking in with the state, the man learned that the officer never filed the report. During the IAB investigation, the officer failed to respond to three emails attempting to schedule an IAB interview; canceled two IAB interviews after being contacted by phone and accepting Outlook invitations; and only appeared for an IAB interview after he was ordered to appear by his sergeant. The officer, whose penalty was increased due to his disciplinary history, was suspended 30 days for failure to make, file, or complete official reports and 30 days for conduct prejudicial when he failed to cooperate with an IAB investigation. The 30-day penalties were served concurrently. He appealed the suspension.

In the second case, on June 29, 2024, a woman went to the District 6 station to file a report for the second violation of a protection order. The woman completed the form and returned it to the officer, who gave her a copy of the completed report. Later, the woman reported a third violation of the protection order, but the responding officer could only locate one prior reported incident from the first violation and could not locate the report she made with the officer. The officer, whose penalty was increased due to his disciplinary history and pattern of misconduct, was terminated for failure to make, file, or complete official reports when he failed to complete a report after receiving an allegation of a protection order violation. He appealed his termination.

In the third case, on August 29, 2024, a man went to the District 6 station to file a criminal mischief report and gave all the details to the officer who was clerking at the desk. The officer failed to complete the report, which the man discovered after he called different DPD units searching for his case. The officer, whose penalty was increased due to his disciplinary history and his pattern of misconduct where he repeatedly failed to create required reports, was terminated for failure to make, file, or complete official reports. He appealed his termination.

Chapter 2 :: DPD Monitoring

In the fourth case, the IAB received a complaint in September 2024 that an officer was making disparaging remarks about coworkers. An IAB investigation revealed that he created and spread disparaging remarks, which created a hostile work environment. He also lied during the IAB investigation. The officer was terminated prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process. He appealed his termination.

■ On December 25, 2023, two officers (“Officer A” and “Officer B”) responded to an auto-pedestrian hit and run accident in another jurisdiction. Officers A and B rendered aid to a male victim they found lying in the street with a bag a few feet from him while waiting for EMS to arrive. Officer B picked up the duffel bag, looked inside, and took it to Officer A’s vehicle. Officer B told Officer A that she believed the duffel belonged to the victim and placed it in the cargo area of Officer A’s vehicle. Officer A drove to the hospital following the ambulance but later reported the duffel bag missing when officers from the other jurisdiction inquired about the duffel bag. The evidence supported the conclusion that the officer did something with or disposed of the duffel bag, and the officer lied about removing the bag from the vehicle during the IAB interview. Officer A was terminated for commission of a deceptive act. She appealed, and a hearing officer affirmed her termination in May 2025.

■ On March 8, 2024, the IAB received a report from another police department regarding inappropriate contact between a recruit officer and a corporal. During her training phase, the corporal sent the recruit officer flirtatious text messages that made her uncomfortable. He also told the recruit officer about problems in his personal life, talked about rumors of the recruit officer’s classmate engaging in sexual activity with her corporal, visited her personal residence twice while on duty, and fell asleep while on duty. The corporal took the recruit officer to secluded locations and deactivated his BWC, which he did not do with other recruits. The recruit officer resigned as a result of her treatment by the corporal. The corporal was suspended five days for sleeping on duty and terminated for violating the DOS Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. He appealed and a hearing officer affirmed his termination.

■ On March 20, 2024, an off-duty officer on her way to work struck another car, left the scene of the traffic accident without contacting the driver of the car she hit, and failed to notify law enforcement of the accident. She also drove her vehicle for more than two and half years with an expired temporary permit. Later, at the station, the officer had a tow company bill the city for the cost of changing a flat tire on her personal vehicle that resulted from the crash. The officer was charged

with Careless Driving, Leaving the Scene of a Property Damage Accident, Failure to Report Accident or Return to Scene, Driving with Expired Plates, and Theft. The officer entered into a plea agreement in which she pled guilty to Careless Driving and the remaining charges were dropped. During the IAB investigation, the officer was untruthful when she claimed that she stopped after the collision and that she did not observe brake lights on the car she collided with. The IAB investigation revealed that the officer never brought her vehicle to a stop and the brake lights of the car were illuminated at the time of the collision and again when the car was down the street. The officer was terminated for conduct prohibited by law and commission of a deceptive act. The officer appealed and a hearing officer affirmed her termination.

■ On October 19, 2024, an officer received a box of evidence related to a criminal case while working at the information desk at a District Station. The officer threw the items into a trash can at the station. Two days later when a detective asked about the evidence, the officer stated that the box was next to the wall by the garage. After the detective told the officer he could not find the box, the officer responded to the station on his day off and located the evidence in the dumpster. When completing a written statement, the officer indicated that the evidence was somehow placed into the garbage can. However, video revealed he had discarded the items into the trash can. The officer was fined two days for violating the DPD's Evidence and Personal Property Policy and terminated for commission of a deceptive act. He appealed his termination, and a hearing officer reversed the termination and affirmed the two-day fine.

Resignations and Retirements³⁹

■ In December 2021, the IAB received a complaint about a sergeant inappropriately touching a female subordinate. An IAB investigation revealed that the sergeant engaged in unwanted touching when he ran his hands through the woman's hair, placed his hand on her leg, rubbed her back, and touched her neck. The sergeant resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ In 2022, an officer received payment for over fifty scheduled off-duty shifts at a Nordstrom Rack that he failed to report and work. The officer pleaded guilty to Theft. The officer resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ On November 3, 2023, an officer was transporting a person from a car-jacking incident. The officer struck the man who posed no threat three times while he was

Chapter 2 :: DPD Monitoring

handcuffed and seat-belted to his seat. He was found guilty of Harassment. The officer resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ On November 11, 2023, an officer was assisting with placing a person into custody and utilized his TASER twice to drive stun the person under circumstances where deployment of a TASER was unauthorized. The officer resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ On March 11, 2024, the IAB received a complaint regarding a sergeant's inappropriate supervisory conduct. An IAB investigation revealed that the sergeant openly discussed performance issues of one of the detectives on his team, including his desire to remove the detective from the team, with other members of the team. He also had a peer detective assist in writing their Performance Improvement Plan and had that peer participate in a counseling session with the detective. The sergeant neglected his supervisory responsibilities by failing to outline his expectations or check in with his detectives and he failed to promote an appropriate work environment for most of the detectives under his supervision. The sergeant resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

■ On April 12, 2024, the IAB received a complaint that an officer sent a woman, who he met working off-duty, unwanted phone calls, texts, and Facebook messages, making her uncomfortable. An IAB investigation revealed that the officer persistently flirted and expressed a desire to "hook up" with her. The officer resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

Other Significant Cases, Including Suspensions of Ten or More Days

■ On November 28, 2022, officers arrested a man suspected of stealing a vehicle. Two officers ("Officer A" and "Officer B") helped place the man in handcuffs and walked him to their vehicle. Initially, Officer A searched the man's left side. Officer B searched the man's right side and a backpack the man was carrying, finding a handgun and a loaded magazine inside the backpack. Officer A then searched the man again and placed him inside the vehicle. Officers A and B transported the man to the Downtown Detention Center ("DDC"), where the man fired a handgun he had in a holster clipped to his pants, striking Officer B in his neck.⁴⁰ Officer A was suspended for 14 days for violating the DPD search policy when she failed to find the holstered firearm in her search.

■ On November 23, 2023, officers from another jurisdiction responded to a call of an assault at a residence. During their initial investigation, the officers learned that an off-duty officer yelled at his girlfriend, called her names, and punched a pantry door during an argument. As the officers waited on the porch of the residence, they saw a vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign before pulling into the driveway of the residence. An off-duty officer emerged from the car with thick and slurred speech, difficulty with his balance, and a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. His blood alcohol content test measured at 0.186. The officer was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Failure to Stop at a Stop Sign, and Harassment Characterized by Domestic Violence. The officer pleaded guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired and the remaining charges were dismissed. The officer has been placed on an Adult Interlock License until February 25, 2026. The officer cannot drive patrol cars during this license restriction, so he has been assigned to desk duty. The officer was suspended for 15 days for conduct prohibited by law.

■ On March 29, 2024, the IAB received a complaint about the social media content belonging to a sergeant. An IAB investigation revealed that the sergeant made various questionable social media posts while identifying himself as a DPD officer. The identified social media posts included, but were not limited to, a reel recording of the sergeant driving a DPD vehicle without a seatbelt, using disrespectful language towards women, posting images of another DPD officer's bloody finger without their permission, and posting shirtless photos of himself that may be considered sexualized. The officer was suspended for 10 days for violating the DPD's Social Media Policy.

■ On July 4, 2024, two deputies in another jurisdiction conducted a traffic stop of an off-duty officer driving his personal vehicle. The officer admitted to drinking earlier in the evening. A deputy conducted a portable breath test, which reported a BAC of .085, and the officer was arrested. He later pleaded guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired. The officer was suspended for 10 days for conduct prohibited by law.

Commendations and Awards

The DPD gives commendations and awards to officers whose actions rise above the expected standards of key departmental values, such as honor, courage, and commitment to community service. Table 2.4 presents the number and type of commendations awarded to DPD officers in the first half of 2025. The most common commendation recorded in the first half of 2025 were Commendatory Action Reports. Table 2.5 provides definitions for select commendations.

Table 2.4 DPD Commendations and Awards, First Half of 2025

Commendation Type	Count	Percentage
Commendatory Action Report	84	46%
Unassigned	31	17%
Official Commendation	30	17%
Merit Award	17	9%
Commendatory Letter	11	6%
Distinguished Service Cross	3	2%
Life Saving Award	2	1%
Citizens Appreciate Police	1	1%
Preservation of Life	1	1%
STAR Award	1	1%
Total	181	100%

Table 2.5: Select Commendation Types and Descriptions

Commendation Type	Description
Medal of Honor	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual for an act of outstanding bravery or heroism by which the individual has demonstrated in great degree the characteristics of selflessness, personal courage, and devotion to duty at the risk of his or her own life. The individual's actions substantially contributed to the saving of, or attempted saving of a human life.
Medal of Valor	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual for an act, in the face of great danger, wherein valor, courage, and bravery are demonstrated over and above that normally demanded and expected.
Preservation of Life	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual who performs an act of heroism, demonstrates good judgment, zeal, or ingenuity over and above what is normally demanded and expected, to preserve the life of another during a critical, volatile, or dangerous encounter while protecting the safety and security of the public and their colleagues.
Distinguished Service Cross	Awarded by the Chief of Police to members who are cited for gallantry not warranting a Medal of Honor or a Medal of Valor. The heroic act(s) performed must render the individual conspicuous and well above the standard expected.
Purple Heart Award	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual who is seriously or critically injured while performing a heroic and/or police action. This award is limited to those cases resulting from attack by an assailant, personal combat, or the performance of an act of valor.
Excellence in Crime Prevention	Awarded to an individual who demonstrates personal initiative and ingenuity by developing a program or plan which contributes significantly to the department's crime prevention strategy, or through innovation combats issues affecting the community.
Lifesaving Award	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual who, through exceptional knowledge and behavior, performs a physical act which saves the life of another person and there is no danger to the individual's life.
Community Service Award	Awarded to an individual who, by virtue of sacrifice and expense of his or her time or personal finance, fosters or contributes to a valuable and successful program in the area of community service or affairs, or who acts to substantially improve police/community relations through contribution of time and effort when not involved in an official capacity.
Official Commendation	Awarded to an individual who by exemplary conduct and demeanor, performs at a superior level of duty, exhibiting perseverance with actions resulting in a significant contribution to the department and/or improvement to the quality of life in the community.
Merit Award	Awarded by the Chief of Police to an individual who distinguishes themselves with exceptional meritorious service. Through personal initiative, tenacity, and great effort acts to solve a major crime or series of crimes or develops a program or plan which contributes significantly to the department's objectives and goals.
STAR Award	Awarded to an individual who, through exceptional tactics, acts to successfully resolve a critical incident, thereby promoting a culture of safety and professionalism to which all officers should aspire. The tactics displayed or performed must be conspicuously effective and above the standard expected.
Officer of the Year Award	Presented annually to an officer who has represented the department in all facets of law enforcement with a commitment to excellence, in support of the mission and values of the organization. The officer has consistently persevered in the prevention of crime and demonstrated initiative, leadership, and dedication to the law enforcement profession.

Highlighted Commendations

Commendatory Action Report

On January 23, 2024, an officer arrived promptly to the scene of an accident where an individual ran through a fence. The community member who owned the fence said that the officer was firm but fair with the person who crashed into the fence. The community member noted that the officer did his job professionally and deserved to be recognized for his work. The officer received a Commendatory Action Report.

Lifesaving Award

On April 11, 2025, an officer responded to an emergency call for assistance for an off-duty officer who sustained a gunshot wound to the leg. The officer immediately applied a tourniquet and kept the officer awake and alert. He provided continued medical assistance and ensured the safety of the injured officer until paramedics arrived. The injured officer was immediately transported to the hospital for emergency treatment and survived. The paramedics credited the officer's decisive actions and use of a tourniquet with preserving the injured officer's life. The officer received a Lifesaving Award.

Merit Award

In November 2024, the Sex Crimes Unit discovered that a serial sex offender was assaulting women. Through his meticulous police work and collaboration, a detective was able to identify this dangerous perpetrator, whose attacks were increasing in violence and frequency. The detective demonstrated extraordinary skill in building trust with the survivors, which empowered the women to participate in the investigative and judicial process. He coordinated efforts between multiple agencies and served as an advisory witness with the prosecution. These efforts helped secure a sentence of 80 years to life in the Department of Corrections. The detective was awarded the Merit Award.

Official Commendation

On May 13, 2025, officers arrived at a parking structure where they observed a man who was perched on the ledge of the fifth floor with a knife and had cut the inner part of his left wrist. One officer ("Officer A") took lead in establishing rapport with the man. Officer A gained the confidence of the man, resulting in him partially sliding from the ledge. Officer A took physical control of the man and allowed other officers to secure the individual. He received an Official Commendation.

Preservation of Life

On April 9, 2025, officers contacted a man who threatened to kill himself with a knife. One of the officers (“Officer A”) took the initiative to negotiate with the man to drop the knife. Through communication and empathy, Officer A was able to build rapport with the man, encouraging him to open up about his personal struggles. After an hour of negotiations, Officer A convinced the man to discard the knife and surrender, which enabled the officers to safely take the man into protective custody. Officer A received a Preservation of Life Award.

3 Denver Sheriff Department Monitoring


Introduction

The OIM is responsible for monitoring and reporting about patterns in DSD complaints and commendations.⁴¹ Since 2019, these complaints have been primarily handled by the DOS Public Integrity Division, with its Administrative Investigations Unit (“AIU”) conducting investigations and Conduct Review Unit (“CRU”) making initial recommendations regarding whether there were any potential policy or procedural violations. In this chapter, we review information about DSD complaints, investigations, findings, discipline, and commendations.

Complaints Recorded in the First Half of 2025

Figure 3.1 reports the number of complaints recorded in the AIU records management database (“IAPro”) in the first half of 2025 and the first halves of the previous three years.⁴² These numbers do not include most scheduled discipline cases, such as when DSD deputies misuse leave time or fail to participate in firearms training or qualification, but they do include complaints involving violations of the DSD Department Order 1.00.3001 - Body Worn Cameras (“BWC Department Order”).⁴³ The AIU recorded 104 community and inmate complaints in the first half of 2025, which is a 12% increase compared to the first half of 2024. Internal complaints recorded by the AIU increased by 14%, from 192 in the first half of 2024 to 219 in the first half of 2025.

Figure 3.1: Complaints Recorded by Complaint Type, First Halves of 2022–2025



As we have noted in previous reports, it is very difficult to explain fluctuations in the number of complaints filed over time. Patterns in complaints can change as the result of developments in organizational policy, practice, or training. Complaint numbers can also increase or decrease in response to a range of other factors, including, but not limited to, media coverage, changes in complaint-triage practices, and changes in the types of complaints that are recorded or not recorded.

Most Common Complaint Specifications

Individual complaints may include one or more specifications, which reflect the rules that a DSD deputy might be disciplined for violating.⁴⁴ Table 3.1 reports the most common specifications recorded against DSD deputies in the first half of 2025 and the first halves of the previous three years.

Chapter 3 :: DSD Monitoring

Table 3.1: Most Common Specifications, First Halves of 2022–2025

Specification	1st Half 2022	1st Half 2023	1st Half 2024	1st Half 2025
Disobedience of Rule	13%	43%	38%	38%
Failure to Perform Duties	1%	4%	3%	9%
Unassigned	22%	11%	8%	9%
Discourtesy	7%	3%	5%	6%
Inappropriate Force on a Person	12%	4%	5%	5%
Complete Reporting	1%	3%	7%	5%
Failure to Make Required Rounds	0%	0%	1%	4%
Failure to Supervise	1%	3%	1%	3%
Failure to Protect Prisoners from Harming Themselves or other Prisoners	0%	0%	1%	2%
All Other Specifications	43%	28%	30%	19%
Total Number of Specifications	287	624	574	688

The most common specification was Disobedience of Rule. The Disobedience of Rule specification prohibits deputies from violating “any lawful Departmental rule (including [Career Service Authority] rules), duty, procedure, policy, directive, instruction, or order (including Mayor’s Executive Order)” and covers a wide range of potential misconduct.⁴⁵

Table 3.2 provides more details by reporting the most common rules, policies, and orders (“Directives”) associated with Disobedience of Rule specifications recorded against DSD deputies in the first half of 2025 and the first halves of the previous three years. The most common directive was the BWC Department Order, which defines the circumstances under which deputies are required to record events using their BWCs and the process by which they must upload and document recorded video.

Table 3.2: Most Common Directives Associated with Disobedience of Rule Specifications, 2022–2025

Directive	2022	2023	2024	2025
Body Worn Cameras	18%	87%	83%	71%
Use of Force	5%	1%	1%	5%
Data and Technology Governance	0%	0%	4%	3%
Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and Prohibition of Harassment and Discrimination	0%	0%	1%	3%
Inmate Property	3%	0%	0%	2%
All Other Directives	74%	11%	11%	16%
Total Number of Directives	38	270	218	262

Intake Investigations, Screening Decisions, and Outcomes

In the first half of 2025, the DOS Public Integrity Division closed 178 complaints. Table 3.3 reports the final disposition of the complaints filed by community members and inmates and internal complaints filed by the AIU and DSD employees.⁴⁶ The majority of community/inmate complaints closed in the first half of 2025 were declined after an initial intake investigation (91%), while a smaller percentage of internal complaints were closed as declines (37%).⁴⁷ Internal complaints were much more likely to result in a sustained finding than community/inmate complaints. Specifically, 37% of internal complaints closed in the first half of 2025 resulted in at least 1 sustained finding, while 3% of community/inmate complaints resulted in a sustained finding.

Table 3.3: Outcomes of Closed Complaints, First Half of 2025

Outcome	Community/Inmate Complaints	Internal Complaints
Declined	91%	37%
For Information Only/Unassigned	1%	8%
Mediation	1%	0%
Informal	1%	5%
Not Sustained/Exonerated/Unfounded	2%	13%
Sustained	3%	37%

Significant Disciplinary Cases Closed in the First Half of 2025⁴⁸

Resignations and Retirements⁴⁹

■ On April 8, 2023, a deputy interfered with the grievance process by personally responding to an inmate's grievance in which she was named as a subject, instead of giving the grievance to a sergeant or someone of a higher rank to respond. The deputy retired prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ On August 28, 2023, two deputies ("Deputy A" and "Deputy B") were executing a felony warrant arrest. Deputy A arrived at the scene, exited his vehicle with his duty weapon pointed at the suspect and instructed him to get on the ground. Deputy A failed to identify himself as a deputy sheriff as required by policy. Deputy B exited her vehicle, approached the suspect and instructed him to place his hands behind his back. Deputy B then handcuffed the suspect and searched him. Deputy B also failed to identify herself as a deputy sheriff. On the day of the incident, DSD vehicles with partitions were unavailable. Policy requires that in vehicles without a partition a second warrant deputy must sit in the back of the seat with the arrestee. Deputy A transported the arrestee in the front seat of his vehicle, and Deputy B did not accompany Deputy A during the transport. Both deputies resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ On August 31, 2023, at 1:41 AM, during the first watch briefing, a deputy approached a sergeant and told him that he had been drinking before going to bed at 6:30pm the previous evening. The sergeant asked for a captain's help on how to deal with the situation, and the captain instructed the sergeant to take the deputy to the hospital for breath alcohol testing. The deputy registered a BAC of 0.129 in the first breathalyzer test and a BAC of 0.124 in the second. The deputy was placed on investigatory leave on September 1, 2023. The deputy resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ On December 30, 2023, a deputy came on post and noticed an inmate using the telephone kiosk with his cell door flap open. The inmate was locked inside his cell and was not threatening to harm himself or anyone else, but the cell door flap was not supposed to be open. The deputy told the inmate to give up the telephone kiosk so she could close his cell door flap. When the inmate refused, the deputy engaged in a tug of war with the inmate although she was required by policy to contact a supervisor to determine how to handle the situation. During the tug of war, the

deputy grabbed the inmate's arm through the cell door flap and swatted it multiple times. The deputy resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ In January 2024, a complaint was filed alleging that a deputy was using his position as a deputy to emotionally and physically abuse women. The investigation revealed that the deputy had used the National Crime Information Center/Colorado Crime Information Center ("NCIC/CCIC") for personal use on multiple occasions. He had accessed and disseminated official and confidential information with unauthorized individuals outside of his assigned duties and in violation of DSD rules. On at least one occasion, the deputy had taken video of a deceased individual in a crime scene and had sent it to his girlfriend. The deputy resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ On March 11, 2024, a deputy working at the DDC allowed inmates from different groups out of their cells at the same time and left their cell doors open. During that time, four inmates got access to the cell of another inmate and assaulted him for approximately two minutes. The inmate sustained injuries to his face, neck, and shoulders. During the investigation, the deputy denied having knowledge of or allowing the attack on the inmate to occur. Facility video shows that the deputy observed several inmates gathering around the assaulted inmate's cell. The investigation revealed that the deputy failed to conduct rounds for more than two hours that day. Approximately 33 minutes after the assault, a captain entered the pod to complete a round. During his round, he walked past the assaulted inmate's cell but failed to notice that there were multiple inmates gathered in the cell and some were not wearing appropriate uniforms. By failing to investigate the strange behaviors occurring within the assaulted inmate's cell, the captain failed to notice that the inmate had been injured and required medical attention. The captain was suspended for 10 days for failing to pay full attention to his duties and failing to make rounds as required. The deputy resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

■ On October 10, 2024, a female deputy working at the DDC was training a male deputy at the officer's desk. The male deputy was sitting in front of the computer, and the female deputy was sitting in a chair next to him. When the female deputy reached over to show the male deputy something on the computer screen, the male deputy grabbed, caressed, and squeezed the female deputy's inner thigh, causing her to be extremely uncomfortable. The male deputy resigned prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary process.

Other Significant Cases, Including Suspensions of Ten or More Days

■ On April 15, 2024, a deputy working at the DDC failed to conduct any rounds between the hours of 10pm and 2am the following day. The deputy did not document or notify a supervisor about his failure to complete rounds. The deputy was suspended for 14 days.

■ On May 23, 2024, a female sergeant was working with a female inmate during the intake process. The inmate had arrived from the hospital, was uncooperative, and she appeared intoxicated or possibly experiencing a mental health episode. During the intake process, the inmate pleaded numerous times for water and indicated her need to use the restroom. The sergeant denied the inmate's repeated requests and focused solely on completing the intake process. When the inmate refused to cooperate to be fingerprinted unless she was given some water, the sergeant decided to escort her to a pod instead of temporarily placing her in an intake isolation cell where she could sober up, drink water, and use the restroom. While the sergeant and several deputies were escorting the inmate to the housing pod, the inmate urinated herself. The sergeant and several female and male deputies placed the inmate in a cell. While in the cell, the sergeant ordered two male deputies to remain present and assist with the forcible removal of the inmate's hospital-issued clothing. The sergeant also failed to include in her report that she ordered the male deputies to remain while the woman was undressed. The sergeant was suspended for 30 days for conduct prejudicial, failing to complete required reports, and violating a policy that states no deputy or staff will be permitted to conduct or witness a strip search of an inmate of the opposite sex. She appealed and a hearing officer affirmed her suspension.

Appeals of Significant Discipline Imposed Prior to 2025 and Filed with or Decided by the Career Service Board in the First Half of 2025⁵⁰

■ On January 15, 2024, a deputy ("Deputy A") working in a housing unit ordered an inmate to get off the phone and return to his cell. The inmate initially argued but eventually placed his hands behind back and began walking to his cell. The inmate kicked a sandal backwards at another deputy, and Deputy A told the inmate to "cuff up" and grabbed him. The inmate continued to walk towards his cell, and Deputy A swept the inmate's leg out from under him, causing him to fall to the

ground. Several other deputies who had arrived at the housing unit held the inmate while Deputy A tried to place handcuffs on the inmate. Although the inmate was controlled, Deputy A used his taser and drive-stunned the inmate on his lower back. Deputy A was suspended for 10 days for using inappropriate force. He appealed, and a Hearing Officer affirmed the suspension. The deputy has appealed that decision to the Career Service Board.

■ On April 26, 2024, a sergeant was pulled over for traveling 90-mph in a 55-mph zone. When the officer approached the sergeant's vehicle and asked to see her driver's license, the sergeant held out her badge holder alongside her driver's license, prominently displaying her DSD identification. During the investigation of the incident, the sergeant lied about her actions. The sergeant was terminated for commission of a deceptive act, suspended for 38 days for soliciting preferential treatment, and suspended for 3 days for conduct prohibited by law. She appealed, and a Hearing Officer affirmed the termination. The deputy has appealed that decision to the Career Service Board.

Commendations and Awards

The DSD gives commendations and awards to deputies who engage in actions that reflect the DSD mission to provide safe and secure custody for those placed in its care. Community members can submit commendations by filling out the OIM's online complaint/commendation form, mailing the OIM a completed postage pre-paid complaint/commendation form, or e-mailing or faxing a commendation to the OIM. Appendices A and B describe how commendations can be filed and where OIM complaint/commendation forms are located.

Table 3.4 presents the number and type of commendations awarded to DSD personnel in the first half of 2025.⁵¹ The most common commendation recorded in the first half of 2025 was the Exemplary Service Award. This award "recognizes uniformed staff who have had perfect attendance for the year."⁵²

Chapter 3 :: DSD Monitoring

Table 3.4 Commendations Awarded to DSD Deputies in the First Half of 2025

Commendation Type	Count
Exemplary Service Award	32
Chief's Commendation	31
PRIDE Award	21
Buckle Award	19
Employee of the Month	12
Community Service Award	5
Supervisor's Commendation	5
Lifesaving Award	2
Alvin J. LaCabe Award	2
Merit Award	1
Social Service Award	1
Employee of the Quarter (EOQ)	1
Total	132

Highlighted Commendations

Lifesaving Award

A sergeant received a Lifesaving Award for catching a person in custody while trying to commit suicide by leaping off of the upper level of the housing unit. The sergeant was able to take control of the individual's lower body and support him to the ground until more staff arrived.

A deputy discovered a person in custody who was experiencing a medical emergency. The individual was unresponsive, had no pulse, and was not breathing. The deputy performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation until the inmate became responsive. The deputy received a Lifesaving Award.

Buckle Award

A captain received a Buckle Award for his outstanding initiative, cost-saving efforts, and positive contributions to workplace morale and operations. The captain disassembled and thoroughly cleaned the ice machine at the Vehicle Impound Facility ("VIF") that was believed to be broken. He oversaw the beautification of the exterior staff area at the facility, created improved signage to better guide members of the public, and organized a potluck BBQ that brought together uniformed and civilian staff members.

A sergeant received a Buckle Award for enhancing the DSD's image and operational efficiency. Since his assignment to the Logistics Unit, the sergeant assisted with critical facility maintenance at the Denver County Jail and the DDC. He redesigned and remodeled the employee lounge, refinished and replaced floors, painted offices, and installed carpet to refresh key areas.

A sergeant received a Buckle Award for his unwavering commitment to excellence and his continued efforts to improve operations and outcomes within the agency. The sergeant led a labor-intensive project to establish a system for tracking the distribution of departmental radios and collaborated with senior leadership to implement a more consistent scheduling system for the deputies assigned to the fourth and fifth floor housing units at the DDC.

4 Critical Incidents

Introduction and Overview

Officer-involved shootings (“OISs”) and deaths during DPD or DSD contact (collectively “critical incidents”) have a profound impact on the lives of community members, officers, deputies, and on the overall relationship between law enforcement and the community.⁵³ All investigations into critical incidents should be completed thoroughly and efficiently with a goal of determining whether the incidents were handled lawfully and according to policy. To promote transparency in the investigation and review of critical incidents, the OIM publishes regular reports regarding the status of critical incident investigations.⁵⁴

Critical Incidents: Denver Police Department

In all critical incidents occurring in Denver, the DPD Major Crimes Unit and the Denver District Attorney’s Office immediately respond to the scene to begin an investigation to determine whether any person should be held criminally liable. For OISs, a representative from the Colorado Department of Public Safety may respond as well.⁵⁵ The OIM also may respond to the scene for a walk-through and debriefing from command staff. Major Crimes detectives interview civilian witnesses and involved officers and collect video and documentary evidence. The OIM watches the interviews by video and may suggest additional questions at the conclusion of each interview. The DPD may ask those questions. After the criminal investigation is complete, the administrative review process begins.

Administrative Review of Critical Incidents Involving DPD Officers

Once the District Attorney's Office has made a decision regarding the filing of criminal charges against anyone involved in a critical incident, the Major Crimes Unit reports are submitted to the DPD's IAB to commence the administrative review. The OIM reviews this information, and the IAB determines whether it will conduct further investigation to evaluate potential violations of DPD policy. Once all evidence to be reviewed is gathered, the case is submitted to the DPD's Use of Force Review Board. The OIM is not a voting member of the Use of Force Review Board but is present for all its proceedings and deliberations.

If the Use of Force Review Board finds that the officer's actions were in compliance with DPD policy ("in-policy"), the case is forwarded to the Chief of Police. If the Chief and the OIM agree that there were no policy violations, the case is closed, and no further administrative action is taken.

If the Use of Force Review Board finds that the officer's actions appear to be in violation of any DPD policy ("out-of-policy"), the findings are forwarded to the DPD IAB for further investigation, if necessary. Once the investigation is complete, the case is forwarded to the DPD Conduct Review Board ("CRB") for a disciplinary recommendation. If the CRB recommends discipline greater than a written reprimand, the involved officer is given the option to present mitigating information at a Chief's Hearing. Both the Chief's disciplinary recommendation and that of the OIM are then forwarded to the DOS for consideration.

If the OIM disagrees with a recommendation made by the Use of Force Review Board, the OIM recommendation will be forwarded to the Chief of Police or to the DOS, which makes the final decision regarding critical incidents.

DPD Officer-Involved Shootings in the First Half of 2025

Incident #1

On January 21, 2025, a DPD officer was involved in an OIS. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Incident #2

On January 27, 2025, a DPD officer was involved in an OIS. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Chapter 4 :: Critical Incidents

Incident #3

On February 24, 2025, a DPD officer was involved in an OIS. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Incident #4

On March 20, 2025, DPD officers were involved in an OIS. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Incident #5

On June 23, 2025, DPD officers were involved in an OIS. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

DPD Accidental Discharges in the First Half of 2025

Incident #1

On April 11, 2025, an officer accidentally discharged his firearm. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Deaths During DPD Contact in the First Half of 2025

Incident #1

On May 9, 2025, a person died after being contacted by DPD officers. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

DPD Critical Incidents Closed in the First Half of 2025

Closed Incident #1

On March 9, 2020, officers responded to a call about a man throwing bottles at passing cars. The man was sitting on a ledge overlooking a highway below. He spoke with an officer until he laid down on the ledge and rolled off. The man died from the fall. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #2

On July 17, 2022, several officers observed a man punch someone outside of a bar in lower downtown. One of the officers indicated that he believed the man may have a gun. The man was in a large crowd that had formed outside the bar as it was closing. Officers began to approach the man as he was walking away from them on a sidewalk through the crowd. The officers kept pace with the man by walking parallel to him on the street. The man began walking towards the street in between two vehicles, when officers ordered him to stop and show his hands. The man briefly stopped but then moved back between the vehicles and began walking back towards the bar. One officer (“Officer A”) moved to the sidewalk and two other officers (“Officer B” and “Officer C”) stayed on the street. As the man moved toward the crowd, he pulled a gun from the left pocket of his jacket, briefly swung it away as if he intended to toss it, then quickly swung it back toward his torso while pulling his shirt up with his right hand. Then he swung the gun away and let go of it. At about the same time, Officer C, who had stayed on the street and was now facing the bar, fired at the man. Officer B also fired while facing the bar. Officer A, who was standing on the sidewalk facing the man and the large crowd outside the bar, fired in the direction of the man and the crowd of people standing near a food truck. The man was struck several times, fell to the ground but survived. At least five other people standing in the crowd in front of Officer A, were also struck and injured. Officers B and C fired in the direction of the front patio and windows of a bar where numerous people were gathered.

The Denver District Attorney reviewed the incident, and a grand jury indicted Officer A, Brandon Ramos, on 14 counts, including Assault in the Second Degree, Prohibited Use of a Weapon, and Reckless Endangerment. Officer Ramos pleaded guilty to third-degree assault and was sentenced to 18 months of probation.⁵⁶ The DPD’s Use of Force Review Board met on August 28, 2024, and determined that Officer Ramos’ actions were out of policy, but those of Officer B and C were in policy. The IAB opened up a misconduct complaint investigation into Ramos, but not for Officer B and Officer C. Officer Ramos resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.⁵⁷ The OIM reviewed this case and made recommendations to the DPD and DOS.

The OIM finds that the review of the case as it pertains to Officers B and C is insufficient. The DPD’s use of force policy authorizes the use of lethal force when, “the force employed does not create a substantial risk of injury to other persons.”⁵⁸ Officers must strictly comply with this provision before discharging a firearm and are prohibited from discharging a firearm when, “there is a likelihood of serious injury to persons other than the person to be apprehended.”⁵⁹ Officers B and C

Chapter 4 :: Critical Incidents

were not investigated or analyzed to determine whether or not their actions were within policy. The OIM finds that the actions of Officers B and C should be reviewed in-depth.

Closed Incident #3

On November 4, 2022, officers attempted to serve a search warrant at an apartment where they suspected a man was selling drugs. After the officers announced themselves, the man came out onto a balcony with a gun and said that he was going to kill himself. Officers attempted to negotiate with the man. When the negotiations failed, they fired impact rounds into the apartment windows. The officers heard gunshots from within the apartment. They fired pepperballs and released chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (“CS”) gas canisters into the apartment before eventually entering and finding the man suffering from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The man was transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced dead due to a gunshot wound. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #4

On November 15, 2023, officers responded to a call about a man who had broken the window of a building and tried to enter it by pushing past security. The officers found security guards holding the man on the ground. They placed the man in handcuffs and moved him into a recovery position. The man stopped breathing, and the officers administered Narcan and began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”). Paramedics arrived and transported the man to the hospital, where he died from complications of the toxic effects of methamphetamine in the setting of physical restraint. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #5

On November 27, 2023, two officers (“Officer A” and “Officer B”) approached a man in a parking lot who had a handgun tucked into his belt behind his back. Officers A and B ordered the man to drop the gun. The man ignored the order and told the officers to “[g]o ahead and shoot me.” Officer A continued to speak with the man, ordering him to put his hands on his head and get on his knees. Several minutes later, the man moved his hand behind his back and put it on the gun. Officer B and another officer who had arrived at the parking lot (“Officer C”) fired at the man, who was struck but survived.

The Denver District Attorney reviewed the incident and declined to file charges against the officers. The District Attorney prepared a [detailed letter](#) reviewing the shooting.⁶⁰ The DPD's Use of Force Review Board met on April 23, 2025 and determined the shooting to be in-policy.

Closed Incident #6

On January 24, 2024, an officer observed a vehicle commit several traffic violations. The officer attempted to catch up to the vehicle to initiate a traffic stop, but, before he did, the vehicle ran a red light and struck another vehicle. The driver of the vehicle that ran the red light died as result of the collision. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #7

On March 1, 2024, officers responded to 911 calls that a man had entered a convenience store, stabbed the clerk, and was holding people hostage with what was reported to be a knife. Officers entered the convenience store and discovered that the man and hostages were inside an interior office. Officers ordered the man to open the door, but the man refused. Officers used a battering ram to open the door, and the man yelled, "I'm going to stab this motherfucker right now!" The man and a hostage struggled with each other, and the man lost his footing and fell into a chair. Four officers in the doorway fired at the man, who was struck and died from the wounds. The suspected knife was later discovered to be a lever used for prying.

The Denver District Attorney reviewed the incident and declined to file charges against the officers. The District Attorney prepared a [detailed letter](#) reviewing the shooting.⁶¹ The DPD's Use of Force Review Board met on April 23, 2025 and determined the shooting to be in-policy.

Closed Incident #8

On July 31, 2024, officers responded to a call that a man armed with a gun and a woman had stolen a bicycle and backpack. Officers found the man and attempted to stop him. The man fled on foot, eventually climbing a fence, and stopping in between a garage and cinder block wall. He then shot himself in the head and died of the wound. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Chapter 4 :: Critical Incidents

Closed Incident #9

On August 11, 2024, officers responded to a call about a man standing on the railing of an apartment balcony. Officers spoke with the man in an attempt to get him off the railing, but the man jumped off the balcony and died from the fall. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #10

On August 12, 2024, officers responded to a call about a man who had entered a construction site and was climbing a crane. The officers arrived at the construction site, attempted to communicate with the man, and then watched as he fell from the top of the crane. The man died from the fall. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #11

On August 18, 2024, officers responded to a call about a shooting. An officer identified a van driving away from the scene as being involved in the shooting and attempted to stop it. The van fled, and officers pursued it until the van drove into traffic and collided with another vehicle. The driver of the van then shot himself in the head and died of the wound. The DPD investigated the incident and determined that the officers involved did not violate any policies or procedures.

DPD Accidental Discharges Closed in the First Half of 2025

Closed Incident #1

On March 25, 2024, officers responded to a 911 call about an armed man who had stolen a car. Officers found the stolen car and pursued it until the man crashed. The man got out of the car and began to run away. An officer, who was holding his handgun, chased after the man and attempted to climb over a car. He placed the hand that was holding the gun on the nearby fence post for support and accidentally fired one round. The officer was suspended for 10 days for carelessly handling the firearm.

Closed Incident #2

On May 26, 2024, an officer responded to a call about someone threatening others with a gun. The officer identified a car that he believed to be involved in the incident at a nearby stoplight and got out of his car to initiate a stop. He drew his gun with one hand and, as he placed his second, support hand on the gun, he

accidentally fired one round. The officer resigned prior to the completion of the investigation and disciplinary process.

Closed Incident #3

On February 6, 2025, a technician was cleaning his handgun in the firearms service area of the Denver Police Firearms Unit. After using a clearing barrel at his work desk, the technician loaded a magazine he did not realize had one live 9mm cartridge. Believing the handgun was empty, the technician pulled the trigger, firing the one round into a storage closet. The officer received a written reprimand for careless handling of firearms or less lethal weapons.

Critical Incidents: Denver Sheriff Department

Similar to situations involving the DPD, in all DSD critical incidents, the DPD's Major Crimes Unit generally responds to the scene to begin an investigation to determine whether any person should be held criminally liable. If the incident warrants, the OIM may respond to the scene of the incident for a walk-through and debriefing from command staff. Major Crimes Unit detectives interview witnesses and involved deputies and collect video and documentary evidence. After the criminal investigation is complete, the administrative review process begins.

Administrative Review of Critical Incidents Involving DSD Deputies

Once the District Attorney's Office has made a decision regarding the filing of criminal charges against anyone involved in an incident, the Major Crimes Unit reports are submitted to the AIU to commence the administrative review. The OIM reviews this information, and the AIU determines whether it will conduct further investigation to evaluate potential violations of DSD policy. Once all evidence to be reviewed is gathered, the case may be submitted to the DOS CRU to determine whether there were any violations of DSD policy. If, after reviewing the investigation, the CRU finds that the involved deputy's actions were in compliance with DSD policy ("in-policy"), the case is forwarded to the Sheriff. If the Sheriff agrees there were no policy violations, the case may be closed. The OIM reviews the CRU's findings and makes recommendations to the Sheriff and the DOS.

If the CRU finds that the involved deputy's actions violated any DSD policy ("out-of-policy") or if the OIM disagrees with the CRU's recommended findings, the case may be referred to the Sheriff for a Contemplation of Discipline Hearing. The OIM observes the hearing and participates in deliberations with the DSD, DOS, and City Attorney's Office staff. At that hearing, the involved deputy is given the opportunity to present additional evidence or any mitigating information to explain the alleged misconduct. After hearing from the involved deputy, the OIM makes disciplinary recommendations to the Sheriff. Recommendations from the Sheriff and the OIM are forwarded to the DOS for further consideration. The DOS determines whether the deputy's actions were in-policy or out-of-policy and the appropriate level of discipline, if any.

DSD Critical Incidents in the First Half of 2025

Incident #1

On February 8, 2025, an inmate died while in the custody of the DSD. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Incident #2

On April 3, 2025, an inmate died while in the custody of the DSD. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

Incident #3

On May 7, 2025, an inmate died while in the custody of the DSD. The administrative review into the incident was pending during this reporting period.

DSD Critical Incidents Closed in the First Half of 2025

Closed Incident #1

On October 12, 2022, a deputy escorted an inmate new to the housing unit to his assigned cell and found an inmate sitting on the floor with his head and arms resting on the bottom bunk. The deputy announced a medical emergency and shook the unresponsive inmate. Paramedics arrived and took over resuscitation efforts, but the man died as a result of hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. AIU investigated the incident, and the DOS determined that the involved deputies did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #2

On October 31, 2023, a deputy identified himself as a DSD deputy and knocked on the door of an apartment in order to serve an eviction. When the resident did not respond, the deputy unlocked the door with keys provided by the property manager and had a maintenance technician cut a privacy chain that was holding the door closed. The deputy entered the apartment and found the resident hanging near a bedroom door. The deputy called for Emergency Medical Services, but the resident died. AIU investigated the incident, and the DOS determined that the involved deputies did not violate any policies or procedures.

Closed Incident #3

On May 16, 2024, a deputy found an inmate who had recently been provided breakfast unresponsive in a housing unit cell. The deputy announced a medical

Chapter 4 :: Critical Incidents

emergency, began CPR, and administered Narcan. Paramedics arrived and determined that the inmate had died. The cause of death was determined to be asphyxia by internal airway obstruction. The AIU investigated the incident and determined that the involved deputies did not violate any policies or procedures.

Endnotes

¹ Sworn DPD and DSD staff, including supervisors, are collectively referred to as “officers” and “deputies,” respectively, unless otherwise noted.

² Fiscella, K., Noonan, M., Leonard, S. H., Farah, S., Sanders, M., Wakeman, S. E., & Savolainen, J., *Drug-and alcohol-associated deaths in US Jails*, Journal of Correctional Health Care 26(2), at 183-193 (2020).

³ Denver Sheriff Department, *Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution Task Force: Addressing the Increase in Contraband-Related Incidents* (01/31/2024).

⁴ Naloxone is a medication approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) designed to rapidly reverse opioid overdose.

⁵ Denver Sheriff Department (01/31/2024), op. cit., at 5.

⁶ The OIM is notified by the DSD every time naloxone is used inside the jails.

⁷ Specifically, to prevent contraband from entering the DSD facilities, the Task Force pursued the implementation of the following strategies: Implement an amnesty program to encourage the voluntary surrender of controlled substances; increase support for individuals struggling with substance misuse disorders, including access to medication assisted treatment, fentanyl education, and harm reduction bags; and enhance tracking and inventory management protocols for Naloxone supplies. To enhance the detection of contraband at entry points the Task Force pursued the implementation of the following strategies: Continuing pat-down searches to detect contraband not disclosed through the amnesty program; installation of body scanners capable of detecting substances hidden on a person or stored inside body cavities; train the DSD canines to detect fentanyl and suboxone; and increased and targeted searches throughout the DSD facilities. Finally, to increase prosecution of contraband-related incidents, the Task Force aimed at leveraging existing relationships with criminal justice partners and continuing to provide training in crime scene and evidence preservation to DSD staff.

⁸ Armando Saldate III, *Jail Suspected OD Incident Protocol-Departmental Directive, 2025-001* (July 25, 2025).

⁹ If the suspected overdose involves serious bodily injury, death, or risk of death, the DSD will hold the scene for DPD investigation and processing.

¹⁰ DPD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (effective Jan. 12, 2022).

¹¹ Ibid., Appendix F.

¹² According to figures presented by Chief Ron Thomas at the COB Meeting of 6/13/25, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8_ckgFj0QI.

¹³ California Department of Justice, *Review of Sacramento Police Department, Report and recommendations, Phase II*, Office of the Attorney General (2020); Police Complaints Board, *Education-Based Development in Lieu of Discipline - PCP Policy Report: #24-2*, Washington, District of Columbia (2024); Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, *33rd Semiannual Report of Special Counsel* (Sept. 2013).

Endnotes

¹⁴ The DPD Discipline Handbook makes it clear that, “in cases where an officer is under investigation for misconduct or has been found to have committed misconduct, additional training, in addition to any possible imposition of discipline, should be considered”. DPD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Rules and Regulations § 4.5.3 (effective Jan. 12, 2022).

¹⁵ The Office of the Independent Monitor, *Education-Based Discipline/Development*, Health and Safety Committee of the Denver City Council (July 23, 2025), <https://denver.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7489240&GUID=93F2C403-2ED1-4677-82D2-264D1D56C429>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The portal can be accessed at the following link: <https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Agencies-Departments-Offices/Agencies-Departments-Offices-Directory/Police-Department/Public-Comment-for-DPD-Policies>. The DPD collects public feedback while periodically uploading a revised EBD policy to the portal. Consequently, caution must be exercise when interpreting the public’s comments and suggestions for improvement.

¹⁸ Report on the Manager of Safety’s Disciplinary Advisory Group (June 4, 2008), <https://denvergov.org/files/assets/public/v/1/citizen-oversight-board/documents/resources/2008-report-on-discipline-matrix-creation.pdf>.

¹⁹ Office of the Auditor, *Office of the Independent Monitor: Police and Sheriff Civilian Oversight* (2025), https://denvergov.org/files/assets/public/v/3/auditor/documents/audit-services/audit-reports/2025/police-and-sheriff-civilian-oversight_september-2025.pdf.

²⁰ Target date for the implementation: 03/31/2026.

²¹ Target date for the implementation: 03/31/2026.

²² Target date for the implementation: 3/15/2026

²³ With the exception of some scheduled discipline cases, the OIM does review all misconduct cases whether they are mandatory or discretionary.

²⁴ Target date for the implementation: 03/31/2026. The new database field was created by the city Technology Service (“TS”) on October 16, 2025.

²⁵ Target date for the implementation: 6/30/2026.

²⁶ Target date for the implementation: 9/30/2026.

²⁷ Denver Revised Municipal Code Art. XVIII § 2-375(a).

²⁸ Denver Revised Municipal Code Art. XVIII § 2-388.

²⁹ Denver Revised Municipal Code Art. XVIII § 2-371(b), 2-386.

³⁰ The data reported in this chapter, which do not include complaints against DPD civilian employees, were extracted from the DPD’s Internal Affairs records management database (“IAPro”). The OIM is not an IAPro administrator and has limited control over data entry into the database. The OIM does not conduct governmentally approved audits of the database for accuracy. As a result, the OIM is unable to certify the accuracy of the DPD’s Internal Affairs data. Finally, because the OIM is not the final arbiter of what allegations to record in IAPro and against which

officers, the OIM cannot certify that the data presented (with respect to specific complaint allegations) are what they would be if the OIM were making these decisions. Since the data were drawn from a dynamic, live database, the recorded complaint, allegation, and outcome numbers will fluctuate over time and are subject to revision. Changes in coding or analysis of complaints, specifications, findings, and discipline may also lead to discrepancies between historical data presented in this report and data presented in previous OIM reports. Unless otherwise noted, the data included in this chapter were last retrieved from IAPro on August 22, 2025.

³¹ Scheduled discipline violations include Failure to Appear in Court, Failure to Shoot for Efficiency, Photo Radar, Safety Restraining Devices, Required Minimum Annual Continuing Education, Continuing Education Programs Cancellation/Continuing Education Programs Failure to Attend, Preventable Accidents, and Punctuality. *See* DPD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Appendix F at 8-9 (effective Jan. 12, 2022).

³² Many reports related to police oversight and IAB processes refer to complainant allegations. In this chapter, “allegations” refer to assertions, in a complainant’s own words, of particular kinds of purported misconduct by an officer. The DPD does not systematically track the detailed allegations made by complainants in IAPro. Instead, it tracks “specifications” that are based upon the departmental rules and disciplinary policies implicated by a complaint. Thus, a specification captures the rule under which an officer might be disciplined, rather than the precise allegations communicated in the complaint.

If a complaint states a general concern with police policy or services, rather than an allegation of misconduct against a specific officer, there is no specification to record. For these complaints, we report the specification as a “service complaint.”

³³ DPD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Rules and Regulations, at 12 (effective Jan. 12, 2022).

³⁴ DPD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Rules and Regulations, at 16 (effective Jan. 12, 2022).

³⁵ Percentages presented in Table 2.1 and other tables and figures in this report may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

³⁶ While the number of force-related complaints that the DPD recorded in the first half of 2025 was similar to previous years, the more significant difference is related to the specification used. In the first half of 2022, the DPD recorded 38 total force-related specifications (6 Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specifications linked to specific sections of the DPD Use of Force Policy and 32 Inappropriate Force specifications). In first half of 2023, the DPD recorded 38 total force-related specifications (31 Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specifications linked to specific sections of the DPD Use of Force Policy and 7 Inappropriate Force specifications). In first half of 2024, the DPD recorded 28 total force-related specifications (28 Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specifications linked to specific sections of the DPD Use of Force Policy and 0 Inappropriate Force specifications). In first half of 2025, the DPD recorded 46 total force-related specifications (46 Duty to Obey Departmental Rules and Mayoral Executive Orders specifications linked to specific sections of the DPD Use of Force Policy and 0 Inappropriate Force specifications).

Endnotes

³⁷ While the practice for handling force-related specifications changed, the DPD has not updated its Discipline Handbook to remove the Inappropriate Force specification or otherwise document a new process for handling these allegations.

³⁸ Complaints with significant discipline closed in the first half of 2025 may not be included in this section if they were summarized in the OIM's 2024 Annual Report. For more information on the DPD's rules and regulations, see the DPD Discipline Handbook online at <https://denvergov.org/files/assets/public/v/2/police-department/documents/discipline-handbook/discipline-handbook.pdf>.

³⁹ The OIM reports only those resignations and retirements that are likely directly related to a pending investigation or pending discipline. For example, the OIM does not report resignations or retirements of officers with pending investigations alleging misconduct that, if sustained, would result in a low-level of discipline such as a reprimand. For each resignation or retirement summarized in this section, the DPD continued the investigation and the Department of Safety ultimately sustained the allegations described.

⁴⁰ The officer-involved shooting related to this incident is summarized on page 61 of the OIM's 2024 Annual Report.

⁴¹ Denver Revised Municipal Code Art. XVIII §§ 2-371(b), 2-375(a).

⁴² Unless otherwise noted, the data for this chapter, which do not include complaints against DSD civilian employees or those referred to the DSD to be handled because they did not include allegations of misconduct, were obtained from the AIU records management database, IAPro. The OIM is not an IAPro administrator and has no control over data entry into the database. The OIM does not conduct governmentally approved audits of the database for accuracy. As a result, the OIM is unable to certify the complete accuracy of the AIU's data. Finally, though the OIM can make recommendations, it is not the final arbiter of what allegations to record in IAPro and against which deputies. Consequently, the OIM cannot certify that the data presented (with respect to specific complaint allegations) is what it would be if the OIM were making these decisions. Since the data were drawn from dynamic, live databases, the recorded complaint, allegation, and outcome numbers will fluctuate over time and are subject to revision. Changes in coding or analysis of complaints, allegations, findings, and discipline may also lead to discrepancies between historical data presented in this report and data presented in previous OIM reports. The data included in this chapter were last retrieved from IAPro on August 22, 2025.

⁴³ Scheduled discipline violations include Unauthorized Leave, Preventable Accidents, Failure to Participate in Required Firearms Qualification/Training, and Refusal to Work Mandatory Overtime. See DSD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Appendix H (updated Oct. 9, 2024).

In 2022, cases related to the Public Health Order requiring vaccination of City and County of Denver employees were also handled as scheduled discipline. They are not included in the counts and percentages presented in this chapter.

⁴⁴ Many reports related to law enforcement oversight and internal-affairs processes refer to complainant allegations. In this chapter, "allegations" refer to assertions, in a complainant's own words, of particular kinds of purported misconduct by a deputy. The AIU does not systematically track the detailed allegations made by complainants in IAPro. Instead, it tracks "specifications" that

are based upon the departmental rules and disciplinary policies implicated by a complaint. Thus, a specification captures the rule under which a deputy might be disciplined, rather than the precise allegations communicated in the complaint.

⁴⁵ DSD Discipline Handbook: Conduct Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines, Appendix F (updated Oct. 9, 2024).

⁴⁶ Of the complaints closed in the first half of 2025, 3 are not included in Table 2.3 because they had a complaint type of “Other/Missing.” These complaints had outcomes of Declined (2) and Not Sustained/Exonerated/Unfounded (1).

⁴⁷ In IAPro, complaints that the AIU referred to the DSD had a variety of dispositions, including “DSD Handled” and “Resolved.” The OIM recoded all of these complaints as “Declined” to reflect the fact that the DSD determined that there was no credible evidence of misconduct and that further investigation was unlikely to reveal any such evidence.

⁴⁸ Complaints with significant discipline closed in the first half of 2025 may not be included in this section if they were summarized in the OIM’s 2024 Annual Report.

⁴⁹ The OIM reports only those resignations and retirements that are likely directly related to a pending investigation or pending discipline. For example, the OIM does not report resignations or retirements of deputies with pending investigations alleging misconduct that, if sustained, would result in a low-level of discipline such as a reprimand. After each resignation or retirement summarized in this section, the DOS ultimately issued sustained findings for the misconduct described.

⁵⁰ Summary data on appeals filed by DSD deputies or by the DOS regarding DSD deputies were provided to the OIM by the Career Service Hearing Office on July 16, 2025.

⁵¹ Data on DSD commendations were provided directly by the DSD.

⁵² DSD Department Order 1.00.2001 § (5)(C)(2)(d) (effective April 2025).

⁵³ The OIM does not generally report on incidents where a community member dies of natural causes or an officer or deputy discharges a firearm at an animal.

⁵⁴ Critical incidents and accidental discharges closed in the first half of 2025 may not be included in this report if they were summarized in the OIM’s 2024 Annual Report.

⁵⁵ DPD Operations Manual §105.04(5) (revised Dec. 2021).

⁵⁶ CBS News, *Denver Police Officer Brandon Ramos pleads guilty in 2022 LoDo shooting* (January 23, 2024), <https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/denver-police-officer-brandon-ramos-pleads-guilty-2022-lodo-shooting/>.

⁵⁷ The disciplinary case associated with this incident was closed February 13, 2025.

⁵⁸ DPD Operations Manual § 105.01(7)(a).

⁵⁹ DPD Operations Manual § 105.01(8)(b)(3).

⁶⁰ Decision Letter from District Attorney for the Second Judicial District Beth McCann to Denver Police Chief Ron Thomas (February 28, 2024), <https://www.denverda.org/wp-content/uploads/decision-letter/2024/Signed-Decision-Letter-on-Officer-Involved-Shooting-Zachary-Arthur-Yates-Nov.-27-2023.pdf>.

⁶¹ Decision Letter from District Attorney for the Second Judicial District Beth McCann to Denver Police Chief Ron Thomas (May 1, 2024), <https://www.denverda.org/wp-content/uploads/decision-letter/2024/Decision-Letter-on-Officer-Involved-Shooting-Christopher-Cauch-March-1-2024.pdf>.



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